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EMERGENCY MOTION FOR STAY 
INTRODUCTION 
Pursuant to Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure and Rule 7 of the Rules of this Court, appellant 
Price Waterhouse respectfully requests that this Court stay 
execution or enforcement of that portion of the District 
Court's May 25, 1990 judgment in this case ordering Price 
Waterhouse to make plaintiff a partner in the Price Waterhouse 
firm, effective July 1, 1990, and awarding plaintiff •back 
compensation• in_the amount of $371,175. The stay~is necessary 
in order to preserve appellant's right to an appeal and to 
prevent irreparable impairment of the effect of a successful 
appeal, to prevent irreparable injury to appellant's right to 
determine who shall be admitted to its professional partnership 
and who may participate in decisions affecting the standards 
and vitality of its partnership, and to ensure the 
recoverability of the back pay~~ward. 
The District Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law on Remand and Order granting appellee Hopkins the right 
to be made a Price Waterhouse partner and ordering payment of 
back pay were issued May 14, 1990 and are filed herewith as 
Appendix A. The Court's Final Judgment and Order was issued 
May 25, 1990 and is filed herewith as Appendix B. Price 
Waterhouse applied to the District Court for a stay of the 
judgment on June 21, 1990. On June 25, 1990, the District 
Court issued an order denying the stay "except as to attorney 
fees," conditioned upon the posting of a bond. Appendix c, 
infra. The District Court gave the following reasons in 
support of its refusal to stay the remaining portion of the 
judgment: 
This appeal has slight chance of success. All major legal issues in this matter have already been resolved in prior appeals in this case. No proof was presented on the merits following remand. Only discretionary equitable relief consistent with established Title VII precedent has been ordered. Any stay of the equitable relief, regardless of the outcome on appeal, will require further hearings on relief and further uncertainty. 
App. C, infra. 
The need for an emergency stay of the remaining 
portion of the judgment is manifest because the District 
court's partnership admission order is effective July 1, 1990. 
This request for expedited consideration was not filed seven 
days before the date upon which action by the Court is 
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necessary because the District Court's decision denying Price 
Waterhouse's stay application was issued on June 25, 1990, only 
six days prior to the effective date of the District Court's 
order. Counsel for plaintiff was notified by telephone on June 
25, 1990 of Price Waterhouse's intent to seek expedited 
consideration of this motion. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, 42 u.s.c § 2000e, gt_~- Appellee Hopkins has 
contended that appellant's 1983 decision deferring for one year 
her candidacy for admission to the Price Waterhouse partnership 
was unlawfully based upon considerations of sex. She has 
sought an order requiring her admission to the partnership, 
back pay and attorney's fees. 
In its initial decision in 1985, Hopkins v. Price 
Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1114 (D.D.C. 1985), the District 
Court found that although appellee's •conduct provided ample 
justification for the complaints that formed the basis [for 
appellant's] decision• and that there were legitimate, 
non-pretextual bases for deferring her partnership candidacy, 
appellant had nonetheless permitted •unconscious• sexual 
stereotyping to play an •undefined role• in the decisionrnaking 
process. The District Court concluded that because appellant 
had not proven by •clear and convincing evidence that the 




have been the same absent discrimination,• id. at 1120, 
appellant had violated Title VII.i/ 
In August 1987, this Court affirmed the District 
Court's decision as to liability •[b]ecause Price Waterhouse 
could not demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence" that it 
would have made the same decision in 1983 deferring for one 
year appellee's partnership candidacy irrespective of her 
gender. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 472 (D.c. 
Cir. 1987).Z/ 
On May 1, 1989, the Supreme Court of the United States 
reversed the decision of this Court. Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989). The Court held that "an 
employer shall not be liable if it can prove [by a 
preponderance of the evidence] that, even if it had not taken 
gender into account, it would have come to the same decision 
regarding a particular person." .I.d. at 1786. The Supreme 
Court reversed the judgment of liability against Price 
Waterhouse and remanded the case for further proceedings 
because this Court and the District Court had •erred by 
1/ When appellee came up for partnership consideration the 
following year, she was not reproposed. The District Court 
ruled that appellant's decision the subsequent year not to 
repropose appellee for partner was nondiscriminatory . .I.d. at 
1115. That finding was not appealed. 
Z/ Judge Williams dissented from the panel's holding affirming 
liability, observing that •the record here provided no causal 
connection between Hopkins' fate and [sexual] 
stereotyping ..•. • 825 F.2d at 474 (Williams, J., 
dissenting). ; 
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deciding that the defendant must make this proof by clear and 
convincing evidence .... • M. at 1795. In an August 1, 
1989 order, this Court vacated its 1989 mandate and remanded to 
the District Court for further proceedings. ~---------
Upon remand and after briefing 
and argument, the District Court ruled that Price Waterhouse 
"ha[d] not met its burden• under the preponderance of the 
evidence standard and therefore was liable under Title VII. 
App. A, infra, at 11. In determining the appropriate remedy, 
the court below concluded that it had statutory authority under 
Title VII to order Price Waterhouse to admit appellee to the 
professional partnership and that such an order was an 
appropriate exercise of its discretion in this case. l.d. at 
16, 19. The District Court also ruled that, although appellee 
had failed to mitigate damages, she was entitled to back pay 
for the period July 1, 1984 through June 30, 1990. 
The District Court entered its final order and 
judgment on May 25, 1990 requiring Price Waterhouse, inter 
alia, to admit appellee into the partnership on July 1, 1990 
and to pay appellee back pay in the amount of $371,175 and 
reasonable attorney's fees. App. B, infra. On June 21, 1990, 
Price Waterhouse timely filed its Notice of Appeal and Motion 
for Stay in the District Court. The District Court denied 
Price Waterhouse's motion for stay on June 25, 1990, •except as 






THE COURT SHOULD EXERCISE ITS DISCRETION TO STAY THE PARTNERSHIP ADMISSION ORDER 
As the District Court found after the first trial, 
"Price Waterhouse is a partnership that specializes in 
providing auditing, tax and management consulting service 
primarily to private corporations and governments . 
partners are certified public accountants and other 
Its 
specialists." 618 F. Supp. at 1111. Notwithstanding its size, 
"Price Waterhouse has consistently sought to maintain the 
traditional characteristics of a professional partnership both 
in its management and partnership selection practices." .Id. 
In its decision in 1983 to "hold" or defer appellee's 
partnership candidacy, appellant was responding to problems 
that appellee had manifested in dealing with subordinates. She 
was "overly aggressive, unduly harsh, difficult to work with 
and impatient with staff.• .Id. at 1113. The District Court 
found that these characteristics were •properly an important 
part of Price Waterhouse's written partnership evaluation 
criteria" and that her "inability to get along with staff or 
peers is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for refusing to 
admit a candidate to partnership.• .Id. at 1114. Appellee 
received more •no" votes on her candidacy than 85 of the 88 
candidates in 1983. And, the District Court twice found that 
appellant's decision no t to repropose plaintiff for partner the 
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following year was nondiscriminatory . .Id. at 1115. In fact, 
the District Court found that appellee's "unreasonable 
intentional conduct" (App. A, infra, at 23) "removed any 
possibility that she would be accepted as a partner" after the 
initial "hold" decision. Id. at 25. 
Nonetheless, the District Court found that certain of 
the comments about appellee in the initial partnership 
decisionmaking process relative to the "hold" decision may have 
been "tainted by unarticulated, unconscious assumptions related 
to sex." 618 F. Supp. at 1118. Thus, although "it is 
impossible to label any particular negative reaction as being 
motivated by intentional sex stereotyping," (.id.) the District 
Court held that those impermissible ingredients "combined to 
produce discrimination" in this case. ,lg_. at 1120. On remand, 
the District Court found unpersuasive appellant's arguments 
that the nature, depth, diversity and intensity of the 
criticism leveled at appellee by partners, and her peers and 
acknowledged by herself, and the evidence that was accepted by 
the District Court that males with similar personality problems 
had also been "held," did not establish by a preponderance of 
the evidence that Price Waterhouse would have deferred the 
partnership of appellee or any candidate with a similar record, 
regardless of sex. 
The District Court ordered Price Waterhouse to make 
appellee a partner in the firm on July 1, 1990. During the 
trial, the Court acknowledged that ordering a partnership in a 
II 
professional firm was an unprecedented Title VII remedy: 
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I now am confronted with whether or not I'm going to exercise my discretion as a judge 
to be the first federal judge~ to put 
somebody into a partnership and I want to 
tell you that that's a difficult decision. 
1990 Tr. at 250 (emphasis added). 
Indeed, no federal court has ever decreed a professional 
partnership as a Title VII remedy. 
Appellant contends that it is entitled to appeal the 
District Court's decision that a partnership is a proper Title 
VII remedy, especially in a case where the candidate was 
overwhelmingly rejected by the partnership for legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reasons, and where her own •unreasonable 
intentional• conduct made it impossible for her to become a 
partner. However, unless this Court stays the decision of the 
District Court, appellant will be forced to make appellee a 
partner on July 1, damaging immeasurably the opportunity to 
appeal and to receive the effect of a successful appeal of this 
unique, important, difficult and unprecedented decision. 
Denial of a stay substantially nullifies appellant's right to 
appeal. 
This Court should exercise its discretion to stay the 
equitable order of the District Court requiring Price 
Waterhouse to admit plaintiff to the partnership during the 
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pendency of the appeal. ~/ s.e..e_ Fed. R. App. Proc. 8. The 
factors relevant in determining the appropriateness of a stay 
include: "{l) Has the petitioner made a strong showing that it 
is likely to prevail on the merits of its appeal? ... 
{2) Has the petitioner shown that without such relief, it will 
be irreparably injured? ... {3) Would the issuance of a stay 
substantially harm other parties interested in the 
proceedings? ... {4) Where lies the public interest?" 
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Comm. v. Holiday Tours. 
~, 559 F.2d 841, 843 {D.C. Cir. 1977) {quoting Virginia 
Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. Federal Power Commission, 259 F.2d 
921 {D.C. Cir. 1958)). These factors require a stay of the 
partnership admission order in this case. 
~/ The posting of a supersedeas bond also may entitle Price Waterhouse to a stay of the partnership admission order under Rule 62{d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ~ Becker v. United States. 451 U.S. 1306, 1309 {1981) (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice) (taxpayer appealing order compelling it to turn over materials in response to tax summons entitled to automatic stay upon posting of a bond). ~ Schulner v. J....... Eckerd Corp., 572 F. Supp. 56 {S.D. Fla. 1983) {stay of 




a. Probability of Success on the Merits 
The District Court's decision raises substantial and 
important questions regarding the jurisdictional reach and 
application of Title VII. Notwithstanding the District Court's 
latest characterization of the partnership admission order as 
"consistent with established Title VII precedent," App. C, 
infra. on denial of appellant's stay application, whether 
federal courts have authority under Title VII to compel 
individuals to become partners is an issue of first 
impression.~/ Indeed, the District Court's opinion 
acknowledged that the question "whether the Court should force 
Price Waterhouse to make Ms. Hopkins a partner presents a 
difficult and unresolved issue." App. A, infra, at 16. 
The District Court purported to rely upon the Supreme 
Court's decision in Hishon v. King & Spalding. 467 U.S. 69 
(1984), for authority to order partnership in this case. 
However, the Court's "narrow holding" (id. at 78 n.10) in 
Hishon that "in appropriate circumstances partnership 
consideration may qualify as a term, condition, or privilege of 
4/ The District Court did not reach the issue whether partnership admission was an authorized or appropriate remedy in this case in the first trial; rather, it held that such relief was not available as a matter of law because plaintiff voluntarily resigned from the firm in January 1984 and had failed to prove that she was "constructively discharged." 618 F. Supp. at 1121. Thus, neither this Court nor the Supreme Court considered the merits of the issues to be presented by Price Waterhouse regarding the validity of the District Court's partnership admission order. 
- 10 -
a person's employment" (emphasis added) for purposes of 
Title VII does not resolve the question of the power of courts 
under Title VII to decide who shall be partners in a 
professional relationship or to regulate the relationship among 
professional partners. In a concurring opinion in Hishon, 
Justice Powell observed that undue "impediments to the exercise 
of one's right to choose one's associates can violate the right 
of association guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments," id. at 80 n.4, and emphasized "that the Court's 
opinion should not be read as extending Title VII to the 
management of a law firm by its partners. The reasoning of the 
Court's opinion does not require that the relationship among 
partners be characterized as an 'employment• relationship to 
which Title VII would apply." .Id. at 79 (emphasis added).~/ 
The District Court's order would not only compel the creation 
of a "relationship among partners," but would also apparently 
afford to the District Court permanent and continuing 
jurisdiction over that relationship. S,e.e. App. B, infra. 
Title VII expressly applies only to "employment" 
arrangements and makes "reinstatement or hiring of employees" 
~/ It appears that most courts have declined to extend federal antidiscrimination statutes, including Title VII, to members of professional partnerships • .5..e..e., e..i.Q..a., Burke v. Friedman, 556 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1977) (Title VII inapplicable to partners); ™ .il.S.2. Wheeler v. Main Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 263 (10th Cir.),~- denied. 484 U.S. 986 (1987) ("To date, courts have shown no disposition to extend [the protection of federal anti-discrimination statutes] to general partners."). 
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an available remedy. 42 u.s.c. S 2000e-5(g) (emphasis added). 
There is nothing to suggest that Title VII was intended to 
empower courts to transform simple employment relationships 
into partnerships, or to order individuals to become partners 
once their employment relationship has been terminated. ~ 
Wheeler v. Main Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 275-76 (10th Cir.), 
~- denied, 484 U.S. 986 (1987). ("The requirement that 
[Title VII and similar federal statutes] cover only employment 
situations suggests that Congress perceived a need to limit the 
application of these statutes."). The District Court's 
decision wholly fails to "giv[e] effect to the meaning and 
placement of the words chosen by Congress," Hughey v. United 
states, No. 89-5691, slip op., at 6 (U.S. May 21, 1990), and 
presents serious questions of statutory interpretation. 
Price Waterhouse also contends that the District Court 
committed reversible error when it ordered Price Waterhouse to 
admit appellee as a partner under the peculiar facts of this 
case. The court compelled partnership admission based upon the 
"ill-defined theory of 'sex stereotyping,'" App. A, infra. at 
32, even though it found that plaintiff "was given a genuine 
chance" to overcome her interpersonal skills problems after the 
1983 hold decision and that plaintiff's own "unreasonable 
intentional conduct,• .iJ;l. at 23 (emphasis added), precluded her 
from "any possibility" of attaining partnership. I.d. at 25. 
The District Court further ordered partnership based on the 
assumption that it was bound by the "law of the case• to the 
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previous constructive discharge decision of this Court 
notwithstanding that that ruling was not only subsequently 
vacated, but was based upon an erroneous reading of the 
District Court's earlier findings of fact. Ordering a 
partnership under such circumstance cannot reasonably be 
characterized as an appropriate exercise of equitable 
discretion under Title VII, even if the statute authorizes such 
relief. It would be particularly inequitable not to stay the 
effect of such a decision pending an appeal. 
Based upon the foregoing, Price Waterhouse submits 
that the probability of success on the merits of appeal from 
the District Court's judgment is sufficient to justify a stay. 
~ Washington Metropolitan Area Transit. 559 F.2d at 844-45 
(probability of success test met and stay of injunction 
affirmed where "serious" and "difficult" questions were 
presented). As this Court recognized in Washington 
Metropolitan Area Transit. the "probability of success on the 
merits inquiry" does not require the Court •to draw the fine 
line between a mathematical probability and a substantial 
possibility of success,• or to engage in an •exaggeratedly 
refined analysis of the merits.• 559 F.2d at 844. This case 
indisputably presents a ••fair ground for litigation and thus 
for more deliberative investigation,•• id. (citation omitted), 
and, as discussed below, the balance of the equities favors a 
stay. 
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b. Balancing the Equities 
The balance of the equities strongly favors the 
granting of a stay of the District Court"s partnership 
admission order because "little if any harm will befall 
interested persons or the public. [whereas] denial of the 
order would inflict irreparable injury on the movant." 
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit, 559 F.2d at 844. 
1. Irreparable Injury 
In the absence of a stay, the members of the Price 
Waterhouse firm will be compelled by judicial decree to accept 
as a partner an individual they had legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reasons to reject, and to enter into the 
"strained partnership relationship" (slip op. at 20) that the 
firm seeks to challenge on appeal as an inappropriate and 
unauthorized Title VII remedy. The order will have unique, 
immediate, direct and permanent consequences for the 
partnership. ~ Washington Gas Co. v. Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, 758 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
Decisions and conduct by appellee as a Price Waterhouse partner 
will in most respects be irrevocable. Relationships with Price 
Waterhouse clients will be irreparably altered. In short, the 
partnership, once established, will be extremely difficult, 




The courts in equity historically have been reluctant 
to compel the existence and continuation of personal 
relationships. ~, ~, Karrick v. Hannaman, 168 U.S. 328, 
335 (1897) (courts "will seldom, if ever, specifically 
compel ... performance of [a partnership] contract, the 
contract of partnership being of an essentially personal 
character") (emphasis added); EEOC v. Kallir Phillips Ross, 
l.D&....., 420 F. Supp. 919, 926-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), (distinguishing 
high level executive positions from "assembly line or clerical 
worker" positions to support denial of reinstatement when the 
position in question "required a close working relationship 
between plaintiff and top executives of defendant• and 
"frequent personal contact with defendant's clients"), aff'd 
without opinion, 559 F.2d 1203 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 
U.S. 920 (1977); Hyland v. Kenner Products Co., 13 Fair Empl. 
Prac. Case (BNA) 1309, 1321 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (rejecting 
reinstatement of executive because, inter alia, "unlike an 
unskilled worker, a person in an executive or management 
position must have complete confidence of others in 
management").~/ 
~/ ~~Clark v. Truitt. 183 Ill. 239, 55 N.E. 683, 685 (1899) ("'An agreement to enter into a partnership, and, as a partner, to use and exercise personal skills and judgment in the control and management of the partnerhsip business, is not enforceable specifically.'") (citations omitted); Marek v. 
McHardy. 234 La. 841, 101 So. 2d 689, 693 (1958) ("Manifestly, in a case like this involving personal services coupled with a promise of the obligees to make the plaintiff their business partner, the court would not oi~er the exceptional relief of specific performance.•). · 
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A Price Waterhouse partnership would entail hundreds 
of such personal relationships with partners and employees of 
Price Waterhouse and, most importantly, with Price Waterhouse 
Thus, the failure to grant a stay will irreparably 
injure Price Waterhouse and will deny effective relief to Price 
Waterhouse if it prevails on appeal. Compare Elrod v. Burns, 
427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (plurality opinion) (the •1oss of 
First Amendment freedoms• of speech and association, •for even 
minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable 
injury."); Dayton Christian Schools v. Ohio Civil Rights 
Commission, 604 F. Supp. 101, 104 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (irreparable 
injury demonstrated where "the absence of injunctive relief" 
pending appeal would have the "practical consequences" of 
depriving appellant from "potential benefits of pursuing 
appellate review"). 
2. Likelihood of Substantial Harm to Appellee 
During the remedial phase trial on remand, appellee 
characterized her present position as a budget officer at the 
World Bank as •an absolutely superb position ... with 
terrific benefits.• 1990 Tr., at 25, attached hereto as 
Appendix D. Moreover, the District Court viewed back pay for 
the period July 1, 1983 through the effective date of the 
partnership admission order as sufficient to make the appellee 
•whole• for losses allegedly caused by Price Waterhouse, and 
there is nothing to suggest that such relief would not be 
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adequate to address any losses suffered by appellee during the 
pendency of this appeal. A stay would not cause any injury to 
appellee different in kind than she has already assertedly 
suffered. Under such circumstances, appellee cannot claim that 
she will suffer "substantial harm" if the Court grants a stay 
of the partnership admission portion of the judgment. 
3. The Public Interest 
Given the extraordinary and unprecedented nature of 
the relief ordered by the court below, the public interest 
manifestly favors the granting of a stay.1/ The Supreme 
Court plurality opinion reversing the initial judgment of 
liability against Price Waterhouse was, in large part, premised 
on "Title VII's balance between employee rights and employer 
prerogatives." 109 S. Ct. at 1786. The Court recognized that, 
in addition to eradicating employment discrimination, "[t]he 
other important aspect of [Title VII] is its preservation of 
the employer's remaining freedom of choice." M- The delicate 
policy balance embodied by Title VII dictates that the status 
IDAQ. be maintained pending appellate resolution of the important 
issues involved in this case regarding the circumstances under 
2/ A stay of the judgment in this "obviously atypical case• 
(App. A, infra, at 33) only indirectly implicates the •public 
interest" factor. ~ Washington Metropolitan Area Transit, 
559 F.2d at 843 ("this is not a case where the Commission has 
ruled that the service performed by appellant is contrary to 
the public interest"). ,, 
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which courts may regulate the affairs of professional 
partnerships. ~ Dayton Christian Schools, 604 F. Supp. at 
104 ("the public interest will be best served by issuing an 
injunction and allowing an appeal" to "assure that a higher 
court will be able to weigh and to consider the need and 
obligation of the state to act to end alleged sex 
discrimination without offending fundamental First Amendment 
values."). If a stay is denied, appellee will become a partner 
of Price Waterhouse and the important issue of whether that is 
a permissible remedy under the Title VII may become, 
practically, if not legally, moot. Id. 
II 
PRICE WATERHOUSE IS ENTITLED TO A STAY 
OF THE MONETARY PORTION OF THE JUDGMENT 
AS A MATTER OF RIGHT UPON THE POSTING 
AND APPROVAL OF A SUPERSEDEAS BOND 
Although the District Court granted Price Waterhouse's 
request for a stay of the attorney's fees portion of the 
judgment conditioned upon the posting of a supersedeas bond, 
the court, witho~t explanation, denied Price Water-house's 
request for a stay of the back pay award on the same basis. 
However, it is well settled, and appellee has conceded,~/ 
that the party appealing a money judgment is entitled to a stay 
~I ~ Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, at 1 ("Plaintiff does not, of course, argue with the proposition that an adequate supersedeas bond will secure and stay the money judgm~nt in this case."). 
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as a matter of right upon the posting of a good and sufficient 
supersedeas bond and approval of the bond by the District 
Court. ~ Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 62{d) {"The stay is effective 
when the supersedeas bond is approved by the court."); American 
Manufacturers Mutual Ins. Co. v. American 
Broadcasting-Paramount Theaters. Inc,. 87 S. Ct. 1 {1966) 
{Harlan, Circuit Justice); Federal Prescription Service. Inc. 
v. American Pharmaceutical Ass'n, 636 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 
1980); 7 Moore's Federal Practice ,r 62.06.~/ This Court 
should stay execution or enforcement of the back pay portion of 
the May 25, 1990 judgment conditioned upon Price Waterhouse's 
posting of a supersedeas bond in an amount sufficient to cover 
the back pay award, plus post-judgment interest, during the 
pendency of the appeal and approval of the bond by the District 
Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court's judgment raises significant and 
difficult issues for appeal and its denial of a stay 
effectively deprives appellant of its right to appeal. The 
~/ The Court has discretion to grant a stay of the judgment in this case without the posting of a bond because there is no "reasonable likelihood of the judgment debtor's inability or unwillingness to satisfy the judgment in full upon ultimate disposition of the case" and therefore an unsecured stay will not •unduly endanger• plaintiff's "interest in ultimate recovery.• Federal Prescription Service, 636 F.2d at 760-61 (granting of unsecured stay appropriate under the circumstances). ~ 
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authority of this Court to maintain the status™- pending 
disposition of this appeal is clear, as is the appropriateness 
of the exercise of that authority in this case. The stay 
should be granted. 
DATED: June 26, 1990 
Qf Counsel: 
Wayne A. Schrader 
(D.C. Bar No. 361111) 
Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr. 
(D.C. Bar No. 420440) 
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER 
1050 Connecticut Ave., N.W. 
Suite 900 




Ulric R. Sullivan 
Assistant General Counsel 
PRICE WATERHOUSE 
1251 Avenue of the Americas 






(D.C. Bar No. 367456) 
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER 
1050 Connecticut Ave., N. w. 
Suite 900 
Washington, D.C. 20036 
(202) 955-8500 
- 20 -
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a copy of the foregoing 
Emergency Motion for Stay, and appendices thereto, to be served 
by hand delivery this 26th day of June 1990, upon James H. 
Heller, Esq., Kator, Scott & Heller, 1275 K Street, N.W., Suite 
950, Washington, D.C. 20006. 
---v _£2~ L~A 
Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr. ~ 
(D.C. Bar No. 420444) 
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER 
1050 Connecticut Ave., N.W. 
Suite 900 
Washington, D.C. 20036 
(202) 955-8500 
